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THE POWERLESSNESS OF NECESSITY 
(FORTHCOMING IN NOÛS 2009) 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper concerns anti-Humean intuitions about connections in 
nature. It argues for the existence of a de re link that is not 
necessity. — 
Some anti-Humeans tacitly assume that metaphysical necessity can be 
used for all sorts of anti-Humean desires. Metaphysical necessity is 
thought to stick together whatever would be loose and separate in 
a Hume world, as if it were a kind of universal superglue. 
I argue that this is not feasible. Metaphysical necessity might 
connect synchronically co-existent properties—kinds and their 
essential features, for example—but it is difficult to see how it 
could also serve as the binding force for successions of events. 
That is, metaphysical necessity seems not to be fit for diachronic, 
causal affairs in which causal laws, causation, or dispositions are 
involved. A different anti-Humean connection in nature has to do 
that job. 
My arguments focus mainly on a debate which has been the 
battleground for Humean vs. anti-Humean intuitions for many 
decades— namely, the analysis of dispositional predicates—but I 
believe (but do not argue here) that the arguments generalise to 
causation and causal laws straightforwardly. 
(ca. 7,200 words) 
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I. HUME’S LEGACY IN POST-KRIPKEAN TIMES 
According to Hume, a belief in necessary connections in nature is unwarranted, for a 
necessary relation is neither discoverable by reason—it is not like a mathematical or 
logical relation (you cannot deduce effects from causes)—nor is it perceivable by the 
senses (it is not seen or felt). So, “being epistemologically problematic, it is 
metaphysically suspect.” (Edgington 1990: 59) 
Hume’s first argument, that we have no a priori means of discovering necessary 
connections in nature, is widely accepted amongst both Hume’s supporters and his 
opponents. However, many philosophers no longer accept Hume’s second 
argument, that we have no a posteriori epistemic access to necessity. These 
philosophers subscribe to ideas put forward by Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, etc., who 
conceive of de re connections as a posteriori, conceptually contingent, yet, metaphysically 
necessary links, and they argue for such connections not only on the grounds of 
semantic considerations about (direct) reference and rigid designation, but also on 
the grounds of scientific discovery. The latter is the place where a posteriori knowledge 
enters the picture. On the basis of these arguments many people saw the chance of a 
revival of anti-Humean metaphysics of a broader kind.1 Speaking here of natural 
laws, Stathis Psillos, for example, comments: 
It was Kripke's liberating views in the early 1970s that changed the scene radically. 
By defending the case of necessary statements, which are known a posteriori, 
Kripke [1972] made it possible to think of the existence of necessity in nature 
which is weaker than logical necessity, and yet strong enough to warrant the 
label necessity. […] As a result of this, the then dominant view of laws as mere 
regularities started to be seriously challenged. (Psillos 2002: 161; my italics)2 
In the final addendum to his Naming and Necessity, Kripke himself already 
cautiously suggests an extension of his findings: 
A good deal of what contemporary philosophy regards as mere physical 
necessity is actually necessary tout court. The question how far this can be pushed 
is one I leave for further work. (Kripke 1972: 769) 
Yet, I am convinced that the influence Kripke has had, on a wide variety of 
issues in metaphysics, must be thought of as merely psychological rather than 
philosophical: Kripke has opened people’s minds for connections in nature which 
have been banned from (some) philosophy since Hume, but Kripke has not come up 
with a kind of link that fits all anti-Humean purposes.3 This is the main subject of the 
paper. I will start with some more abstract preliminaries and then turn towards a 
concrete example, involving dispositions, for more specific arguments. 
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II. SYNCHRONIC/ATEMPORAL VS. DIACHRONIC LINKS 
Metaphysical necessity is, in Kripke’s original arguments, first and foremost 
attributed to:  
- theoretical identifications, that is, the identity of properties: “water is  
necessarily H2O”  
- one’s origin: “I necessarily originated from a particular sperm and  
ovum”,  
- individual objects possessing properties: “This desk is necessarily made  
of wood”. 
In Putnam we also find 
- natural kinds possessing certain features essentially: “Tigers are  
essentially mammals”. 
What these applications have in common is that metaphysical necessity is 
attributed to synchronic or atemporal occurrences, co-existences, possessions, or 
identities of properties.4 
Some extensions of metaphysical necessity’s domain to further areas in 
philosophy of science might well be feasible because they only extend what Kripke 
and Putnam have started. In underlining that certain kinds of objects possess certain 
features essentially, modern scientific essentialism, for example, merely enlarges 
Putnam’s example class: “if something is water it is necessarily a dipole”, “salt is 
necessarily soluble in water”, “electrons necessarily have unit charge”, etc. What all 
these examples have in common with the original cases is that they are synchronic or 
atemporal matters. 
However, many who share these anti-Humean intuitions also seem to tacitly 
assume that diachronic phenomena can also be linked as a matter of metaphysical 
necessity. That is, they make a seemingly smooth transition from static facts to “the 
necessary connections among events in the natural world” (Fine 2002: 1), and seem 
to think that in causation, causal laws, or manifestations of dispositions, one event at 
space-time point <x, y, z, t> is necessarily linked to another event at <x*, y*, z*, 
t+Δt>. Yet, none of the original Kripke/Putnam cases involve necessary relations 
whose relata are, first, temporally distinct and, second, events rather than individuals 
and/or properties. Why, then, do people feel entitled to think that this connection is 
feasible and why would it be desirable in the first place? 
It is desirable for the anti-Humean because it is at the heart of anti-Humean 
intuitions that there is some kind of causal nexus, such that when one event causes 
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another this is not a mere matter of regularity, but involves the first event bringing 
about the other or forcing it to happen. The first event should have some kind of 
causal oomph or biff, that is, a push towards the second. In other words, the belief is 
that there is “something that binds the goings-on in the universe together” (Beebee 
2006: 509) or that there is “a further fact than (mere) regular succession [between 
two particular events] . . . a dependency or connection, a fact making it so that when 
the first happens the second must happen” (Blackburn 2000, 103). 
Now, what would be more convenient than to be able to assume that 
metaphysical necessity—which is, as such, already largely accepted in the 
philosophical community—can fulfil the job description of causal oomph as well? 
Also, some parsimony principle—resembling a kind of monotheistic belief—could 
be behind this idea: what holds the world together has to be One. These appear to be 
the reasons why anti-Humeans are happy to suppose that metaphysical necessity will 
also somehow bind events or temporally separate property instantiations together.5 
Yet, we have to ask again: are they entitled to believe that this is correct? The 
transfer of metaphysical necessity to these cases is only permissible either if it can be 
shown that Kripke-Putnam style arguments which seem to have been successful in 
synchronic (or atemporal) co-existence cases can also be applied effectively to 
diachronic succession cases, or failing a successful direct application of the Kripke-
Putnam machinery of direct reference, rigid designation, etc., if we can make an 
otherwise plausible case for why we should assume that metaphysical necessity is also 
the binding force in these cases. 
There has been at least one attempt to pursue the first strategy:6 in his Scientific 
Essentialism Brian Ellis (Ellis 2001) sketches an application of the Kripkean strategy 
to the diachronic case. Although this application is elliptical in that it does not 
explicitly and fully address the similarities and differences to the original Kripke 
arguments, it has some prima facie credibility. 
However, in the core section (Section V) of this paper I attempt to prove 
metaphysical necessity’s unsuitability to act as a binding force or push that brings 
about successions of events. Roughly, my core argument will be this: whenever a 
process, starting with event C and ending with event E, is temporally extended, that 
is, whenever E is supposed to succeed C after a period of time Δt, there is the in- 
principle possibility of an interference with C such that E could be prevented. If such 
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a possibility exists, C and E cannot be related by necessity. If successful my argument 
shows that neither strategy from above can work.7 
Before I proceed, three short notes for clarification might be helpful: 
(a) I take, at least in this paper, no issue with one aspect of the thesis often called 
“Dispositional Essentialism”, namely that certain natural kinds possess certain 
powers of metaphysical necessity. Claims like “salt is necessarily soluble in water”, 
for example, remain untouched by my arguments. Rather, I focus on solubility itself. 
That is, what I doubt is that a power to do E when C-ed can be analysed in terms of 
necessitation. I claim that something being soluble does not mean that, necessarily, it 
dissolves when put in water.  
(b) I confine myself to the discussion of deterministic dispositions. However, I 
believe that probabilistic dispositions, dispositions that manifest themselves only 
with probability p<1 when triggered, are even more problematic for a necessitarian 
theory than the deterministic dispositions under concern here. 
(c) There is a group of physical laws or principles which are neither clear cut 
cases of causal laws (diachronicity/succession) nor of property identities or essential 
relations between properties (synchronicity/atemporality). For example, it is difficult 
to judge whether atomic decay is a matter of causation or whether it just so happens. 
Similarly puzzling are cases of particles that share an entangled state and are 
therefore so deeply intertwined that measurement events on one of them seems to 
instantaneously affect the other, no matter how far away from each other they are 
located. This phenomenon appears to be synchronic and uninterferable, and it 
therefore comes close to the original Kripke examples. As intriguing as these cases 
are, I must leave them aside here. 
III. THE CASE OF DISPOSITIONS 
We encounter diachronic succession cases in causation, causal laws, and 
dispositions (and maybe others). In order to show the inapplicability of metaphysical 
necessity to such cases I will concentrate on dispositions—more precisely, on the 
history of the analysis of dispositional predicates in terms of (counterfactual) 
conditionals —but I believe my arguments generalise. 
The history of the conditional analysis can be interpreted as an ongoing battle 
between Humeans and anti-Humeans: if dispositions were real they would bring an 
anti-Humean connection to the world. Consequently, those who share the Humean 
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belief that connections in nature do not exist assume that dispositional talk can be 
analysed in terms of language without dispositional predicates. As well as getting rid 
of dispositional talk (a linguistic phenomenon), one would also get rid of dispositions 
(ontologically speaking). Unsurprisingly, the history of such an analysis started with 
empiricist/verificationist attempts to reduce dispositional predicates to an 
observational trigger condition and an observational manifestation which are linked 
by the material conditional (cf. Carnap 1936/37).8 
However, this is not the place to go into these historical details. Suffice it to say 
that this analysis, and its numerous and various successors, had to face serious 
counterexamples and it is one kind of counterexample my main argument will pivot 
on. I will claim that if this counterexample is indeed effective against the Humean 
reductionist analysis, then a certain kind of anti-Humean realism about dispositions is 
also in jeopardy. More specifically, if this counterexample works then it shows en 
passant that metaphysical necessity can hardly be the driving force behind 
dispositional powers as envisaged by some metaphysicians (call them “necessitarian 
dispositionalists” and their thesis “necessitarian dispositionalism”). 
The counterexamples I have in mind are Alexander Bird’s antidotes from his 
Dispositions and Antidotes (Bird 1998) which were directed against David Lewis’s 
sophisticated reformed counterfactual analysis. In order to appreciate the force of 
Bird’s paper we first need to look at Lewis’s analysis, but since Lewis’s definition is 
“an unlovely mouthful” (Lewis 1997: 157) I present a slightly shorter version which, 
I hope, still does justice to the original: 
Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s, iff  
x has some intrinsic property B so that: if x were to undergo stimulus s at time t 
and retain property B long enough, s and x's having of B would cause x's giving 
response r. (cf. Lewis 1997: 157) 
Now, an antidote, as conceived by Bird, is a preventative factor for the temporal 
succession from stimulus s to manifestation r which does not destroy the intrinsic 
basis, B, of the disposed object, but interferes with the causal process starting at t 
with s. One of Bird’s examples is a uranium pile above critical mass (cf. Bird 1998: 
229). The pile has the disposition to chain-react catastrophically and s, the stimulus, 
is realised. Yet, there is a safety mechanism which lets boron moderating rods 
penetrate the pile in case radioactivity increases. The boron rods absorb the radiation 
and prevent a chain reaction (r, the response, is not realised). Although the stimulus s 
occurs (uranium is above critical mass) and although the intrinsic structure of the 
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uranium pile is not altered (B is retained), the disposed uranium does not display the 
disposition’s manifestation r. Hence, Lewis's analysis is insufficient. 
Sure enough, there have been further attempts to save this analysis (or at least 
derivatives thereof). While Humeans remain optimistic that some reduction will 
eventually succeed, anti-Humeans hope that also all future analyses will fail. I will not 
address these issues any further here, however.9 
IV. TURNING THE TABLES 
The main concern of this paper is to show that, supposing we accept the anti-
Humean view that dispositions are real, the link in nature dispositions bring to the 
world cannot be thought of in terms of Kripke-style metaphysical necessity. My 
strategy to prove this claim is to focus on Bird’s counterexample to reductionist 
attempts to analyse dispositional predicates in terms of counterfactual conditionals. I 
will assume that Bird’s counterexample as introduced above is successful. However, I 
will then turn the tables and ask what the anti-Humeans themselves have to say 
about antidote cases where the trigger of a disposition is pulled, yet, its manifestation 
still does not occur. In other words, I will ask how one ought to conceptualise the 
antidote case when one subscribes to necessitarian dispositionalism. This will lead to 
the core of the present paper. 
Above, I have stressed that it should be controversial in the first place whether 
metaphysical necessity (which was originally only applied to atemporal cases of 
property identity or possession) can be legitimately projected onto diachronic cases 
which involve one property instance (or event) at t, namely the trigger (plus other 
activation conditions if needed), and another property instance (or event) at t+∆t, 
namely the disposition’s manifestation. Call this “Argument 0 – Diachronic 
Events”. 
I have also offered two possible strategies to tackle Argument 0, i.e., how one 
could get from the Kripke/Putnam cases to diachronic cases. I will now introduce 
Brian Ellis’s strategy and then show how it can be challenged by antidote cases. 
V. THE POWERLESSNESS OF NECESSITY 
Ellis writes: “Essentialists have their own special brand of necessity. This kind of 
necessity has traditionally been called ‘metaphysical necessity’” (Ellis 2002: 110). His 
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idea is, now, this: not only are there natural kinds of objects which have certain 
properties necessarily (mostly powers in his view), there are also natural kinds of 
processes. And, here is the crucial point, it is of the essence of a natural kind of process  
that two event types are linked by metaphysical necessity. The disposition’s trigger event 
leads with necessity to the disposition’s manifestation event because this process is a 
natural kind of precisely that character: 
Suppose, for example, that p is a natural dispositional property that would be 
triggered in circumstances of the kind C to produce an effect of the kind E. 
Then the processes of this kind will themselves constitute a natural kind, the essence of 
which is that it is a display of P. Therefore, […] for all x, necessarily, if x has p, 
and x is in circumstances of the kind C, then x will display an effect of the kind 
E. (Ellis 2001: 286; my emphasis)10 
Although these claims are elliptical when taken as Kripkean style arguments, I 
will not dwell on the fact that crucial steps are missing: a description of how 
reference is fixed for event-type terms (rather than kind terms) in baptism situations; 
arguments that event-type terms rigidly designate, etc. Rather, I will show that 
unacceptable problems arise in antidote and similar cases if we assume that 
metaphysical necessity enters into the story as Ellis tells it.11 
 
Argument 1 – Monotonicity. Suppose, for the purpose of the argument, that 
there is a disposition D to react with E in circumstances C. (The disposed uranium 
pile is triggered to chain react, E, for it has critical mass, C). As I read Ellis, this is to 
say that there is a natural kind of process: the process from C events to E events. 
Further, C events and E events are (when mediated by the disposition) joined as a 
matter of metaphysical necessity (“Causal relations involve necessary connections 
between events—namely, between the triggers and displays of basic dispositional 
properties.” (Ellis 2001: 106)). The problem is now that in antidote cases, E does not 
come about although C does occur. Yet, how can that be possible if C and E are, due 
to D, linked by metaphysical necessity? Not even an antidote should be able to 
interfere with necessary connections. The crucial point is that necessity is monotonic: if 
C necessarily leads to E, so must C plus the antidote A. 
In fact, this argument is not novel and it is well known in a different disguise: 
necessities—of a logical, analytic or de dicto kind in the following example—cannot 
handle cascading if-then sentences. Remember Goodman’s match: if match m had 
been scratched it would have lighted, but if match m had been wet and scratched it 
would not have lighted, but if match m had been wet and scratched and the 
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surrounding temperature had been extremely high it would have lighted… (cf. 
Goodman 1979: 8). Surely, none of the links in those counterfactual conditionals can 
be of logical, analytic, or de dicto necessity. This is a message which has been 
frequently acknowledged and which was once a reason for, for example, David Lewis 
to develop semantics for counterfactuals which are not as strong as a material 
conditional preceded by a necessity operator. But why should, now, metaphysical 
necessity be able to handle the very same sort of difficulty? It is not clear that it can, 
yet this is what many necessitarian dispositionalists assume. 
In short: while dispositionalists argue, on the one hand, against the possibility of 
a reduction of dispositional predicates along the line of counterfactual conditionals, 
“Dx iff CxEx”, they, on the other hand, seem to relapse tacitly into a view 
involving the stronger “(Cx⊃Ex)”, with “” expressing metaphysical necessity. 
Yet, metaphysical necessity is, as much as logical necessity, modally too strong. It 
does not have the variable strictness counterfactual conditionals allow for: while 
CxEx and Cx∧Dx¬Ex and Cx∧Dx∧FxEx… are coherent, (Cx⊃Ex) 
and (Cx∧Dx⊃¬Ex) and (Cx∧Dx∧Fx⊃Ex)… are not (cf. Lewis 1973: 10, 13). 
 
Argument 2 – Discreteness. The natural reaction towards this first argument 
is, of course, to say that C has never been the correct first relatum of the necessary 
relation under concern. Rather, what is linked necessarily to E is C and the absence of 
any interfering factor. Then the unwelcome C+A poses no problem because that would 
simply be a C with an interfering factor.12 
The problem now is that, as well as being monotonic, metaphysical necessity is 
discrete: that two specific properties or event types, an uninterfered with C and an E, 
are necessarily linked (and hence conjoined in all possible worlds) has no bearing 
whatsoever on the instantiations and correlations of any other properties or event 
types even if they are very much like C and E. As a consequence, the natural kind of 
process from uninterfered with C to E with its metaphysical link cannot help to 
explain a disposition’s power in non ideal cases. Yet, this needs to be explained for 
take, for example, our antidote case: boron rods are safely inserted in our uranium 
pile, and so nothing happens. Pull them out a bit and the amount of free electrons 
will increase, then pull them out further and the situation becomes critical. However, 
this whole spectrum of cases which are gradually approaching C and E cannot be 
explained, in the present picture, by the uranium pile’s disposition to chain react, for 
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that kicks in only when the boron rods are completely removed. As strong as 
necessity might be once it applies, it has no power as long as C is not a pure, 
uninterfered with C. 
Note, that we know of many other instances of such partial displays in impure, 
interfered-with-C cases. In fact, in our actual, messy world they probably outnumber 
the pure ones by far: there is, for example, partially dissolved sugar (because of 
supersaturated water); there are smouldering, yet not burning inflammables (in cases 
of low oxygen levels); there are lower than expected accelerations (because of 
counteracting forces); etc., etc. 
Spelled out in anti-Humean terms, the problem is that if there is only a necessary 
link between C plus the absence of any interfering factor and E, then, because of necessity’s 
discreteness, C*’s (the impure case’s) push towards an impure E* remains 
mysterious. As similar as C* might be to C, and as similar as E* might be to E, 
(Cx⊃Ex) does not explain C*’s bringing about E*.13 
So far, the necessitarian’s strategy fails due to a simple dilemma: either the 
disposition’s trigger C leads with necessity to E—and thus it explains the 
dispositional push towards manifestation E whenever C is realised. Yet, this is too 
strong, for then we cannot account for the fact that E does not occur in antidote cases 
(Argument 1 — Monotonicity of Necessity). Or the disposition’s trigger is C and 
the absence of any interfering factor, but then we cannot account for the fact that E (or a 
partial E) should occur in impure cases. That is, the disposition’s push in impure cases 
remains unexplained. (Argument 2 — Discreteness of Necessity) 
 
Argument 3 — Hyper Mosaics. Here is a way in which the necessitarian 
dispositionalist might try to handle the problem of both necessity’s monotonicity and 
its discreteness: that some object has a disposition D means that an infinite number 
of pairs—the uninterfered with C and E, a slightly interfered with C1 and E1, C2 and 
E2, C3 and E3, etc. ad infinitum—are necessarily linked. Thereby, any possible prior 
state a disposed object could be in (including those with pure triggers and, more 
importantly, those with antidotes or impurities of all kinds) is captured. Even though 
it is discrete, the necessity relation can, if it holds between zillions of particular states 
(of different purity degrees), cover by its sheer number what seems otherwise to be a 
continuous spectrum. Or so the necessitarians might hope. 
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How is necessity’s troubling monotonicity being dealt with? The answer is that each 
of the C, C1, C2, C3 etc., the pure ones and the ones with interferers, are not to be 
conceived of as just minimally circumscribed trigger conditions, for those would not 
save us from further possible but unwanted interferences additional to those we have 
happily included in the Cis. Rather, stipulate that the Cis are complex, structural 
situation types that, when instantiated, fix the sum total of all (positive) states of 
affairs and events at least for a sufficiently large region in space so that further 
unexpected interferers are excluded simply because such a complex state of affairs 
and events includes and fixes all there is and, by fiat, ‘all there is’ simply cannot have 
any extra interferer which could prevent the respective Eis.
14 
The required complex structural event types have to be expanded in yet another 
dimension for we must also consider time: there are cases of late preventions (like 
late antidotes) in which the interference comes about shortly after Ci. In other words, 
while a Ci might have been instantiated without any unwanted interferer at t, it could 
be interfered with at t+∆t where t+∆t is still early enough to prevent Ei at t* (with t 
< t+∆t < t*). But since we have already extended the Cis in space, why not also 
extend them in time? Our Cis are, then, event types that encompass fairly large four 
dimensional areas that are temporally extended at least until an infinitely short time ∆ε 
just before the instantiation of Ei. To have, with certainty, fixed everything causally 
relevant we might want to identify the many Cis with all the physically possible 
reverse light cones (before the respective Eis) a disposed object could find itself in. 
This way, no interference could put into doubt that a certain Ci metaphysically 
necessitates its respective Ei. 
Taking these two steps together (the first to deal with discreteness, the second to 
deal with monotonicity) we arrive at the following picture: while, in ordinary 
language, our dispositional predicates are merely associated with the most interesting 
and frequent, elliptically described conditions (dropping and breaking, being above 
critical mass and chain-reacting), dispositional properties really provide an (infinite) 
cluster of possible trigger-response connections where the multitude of possible 
triggers are all the spatio-temporally vastly extended event types (covering the reverse 
light cones before Ei) the disposed object could possibly be in. It seems that for 
those C, C1, C2, C3, etc. and E, E1, E2, E3, etc. the necessitarian dispositionalist can 
safely postulate necessary connections.15 
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Is this, then, a way in which metaphysical necessity could be seen as the anti-
Humean link dispositions bring to the world? Does a disposition indeed amount to a 
bundle of an infinite number of metaphysically necessarily joined Ci-Ei pairs
16, where 
the Cis are enormous event types fixing what happens in very large space-time areas, 
namely the reverse light cones just before the respective Eis?  I still think this is a 
problematic assumption. I will give four reasons why. 
First, note that Argument 0 (Diachronic Events) is seriously aggravated when we 
accept the kind of Cis introduced above as antecedents: while the precedent cases for 
metaphysical necessity are synchronic or atemporal correlations of properties or 
individuals and their features, we have, now, in the case of dispositions, not only 
diachronic relations as already criticised above, but also very different relata. The 
relata turn out to be fine grained and spatio-temporally widely extended situation or 
event types as opposed to simple properties, natural kinds, or individuals. It should 
be rather doubtful that, without further argument, we are allowed to merely stipulate 
that metaphysical necessity is still the appropriate link for these cases. The 
dissimilarities to Kripke’s original cases are too big to warrant unargued 
transferability.  
Moreover, what dispositionalists are usually aiming for is a kind of strong de re 
dependence between a minimal antecedent and consequent which persists despite 
external disruptions. What the necessitarian dispositionalist offers instead are 
connected holistic super states that allow for no disruptions. 
Related to the last point we might want to ask, second, whether we have really 
saved metaphysical necessity’s monotonicity. That is, does the invoked relation really 
pass the test for monotonicity? The test, to recall, is that if C necessitates E then, 
whatever else, A, is the case, it should still be the case that if C and A, then E. The 
monotonicity here is at least questionable, for what we did is stipulate that C is all 
there is and, by fiat, nothing else could possibly be the case. In other words, the 
“monotonicity” we have created seems artificial in that a test for it is prohibited by 
decree. Disallowing the test for monotonicity is, however, not quite the same as 
being monotonous.17 It is, then, for this reason questionable whether we have really 
kept metaphysical necessity in the picture. 
Suppose that the first two worries can be overcome. There is still the following 
third concern: the Ci-event types are so encompassing and so specific that, most 
probably, they happen only once within a world, if they happen at all: most of them 
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are probably never actualised. As a consequence, what happens with necessity does 
not happen often.18 We get regularities or constant conjunctions only across worlds 
(because of the alleged necessity) but not intra-world (because of their unique 
complexity). 
I end with a fourth worry which is independent of the arguments given so far, 
yet, it shows its full force with them in the background. The concern is that if 
metaphysical necessity itself is exhaustively characterised by truth in all possible 
worlds, as necessitarian dispositionalists often seem to assume—“Truth in all 
possible worlds is the defining characteristic of all forms of strict necessity” (Ellis 
2002: 110)—then, no matter whether we believe in the concrete reality of possible 
worlds (cf. Lewis) or are ersatzists of a kind (viewing possible worlds as propositions, 
etc.), it is not clear that the necessitarian dispositionalists have achieved their main 
goal with the above characterisation of dispositionality in terms of necessity: namely, 
the aim to capture a disposition’s power to bring about things. Instead, the resulting 
picture looks more like a kind of über-Humeanism rather than anti-Humeanism: we 
have a kind of hyper-mosaic through possible worlds. Yet, within a world, there is 
still no intrinsic link, nothing with a productive character. All those Ci-Ei pairs in an 
infinity of possible worlds remain co-instantiations of facts that still seem ultimately 
unrelated.19 
Maybe the above four points can find their answers in some elaborate 
necessitarian framework, yet, whatever the answers, the costs of necessitarian 
dispositionalism have been increased to a high degree.20 
V. CONCLUSION 
I conclude that we have reasons to be sceptical about the merits of necessitarian 
dispositionalism, the idea that the link dispositions bring to the world can be 
identified with metaphysical necessity. C. B. Martin once claimed that counterfactuals 
are clumsy and inexact gestures to dispositions (cf. Martin 1994: 8). My conviction is 
that the same can be said about metaphysical necessity. 
Dispositions have to be conceived of as providing less than necessity but more 
than mere contingency: more than contingency, for dispositions tend to produce their 
manifestation, yet, less than necessity, for only in a derived sense do dispositions, 
when triggered by complete world states, ‘necessitate’ their manifestations. Maybe 
dispositional powers can, at least metaphorically, be compared to Newtonian forces: 
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a force pushes an object into a certain direction but it does not necessitate a 
movement, for other forces might well interfere. 
There is, unfortunately, no space to argue any further for this kind of sui generis 
dispositional link. In any case, it is tempting to claim that Hume has given us 
alternatives, not synonyms, when he said that “we are never able […] to discover any 
power or necessary connexion” (Hume 1777: 63; my italics) even though historically this 
would not be considered to be the correct text exegesis. In a natural follow-up to this 
paper I would argue that Hume was right about necessary connections but wrong 
about powers. 
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1 Less frequently, people pursue a different line against Hume’s arguments contra the a posteriori route 
to a de re link. Causation, so claim these philosophers, can be directly and non-inferentially experienced 
in certain instances of force or pressure on our body or successful acts of the will. In fact, I believe 
that a version of these ideas points in the right direction and is, at least for the cases I will be 
concerned with, a more promising move against Hume than Kripke style arguments. Proponents of 
this view are, amongst others: (Michotte 1943), (Anscombe 1971), (Edgington 1990), (Fales 1990), 
(Baldwin 1995), and (Armstrong 1997).  
2 I am not here saying that Psillos is an anti-Humean. I quote him because he gives expression to the 
view that Kripke was involved essentially in the anti-Humean revolution (or, better, restoration) the 
defenders of strong laws have started. 
3 If I were more courageous I would add that I am not convinced by the original Kripkean arguments 
and that I endorse Humean or conventionalist intuitions in regard to (metaphysical) necessity. 
4 An exception is the necessity of origin which seems to link an individual now to some entities back 
then: that I necessarily originated from a particular sperm and ovum implies the past existence of that 
sperm and ovum, i.e., my existence now diachronically necessitates the existence of these gametes then. 
However, there are still differences to the diachronic cases I will focus on later: the origin relation is 
backwards not forwards and also not one of a causing or bringing about character. 
5 Note that some dispositionalists subscribe to the reverse of this claim. George Molnar, for example, 
writes: “necessities in nature […] require truthmakers, and it seems that it will be real powers which 
provide such truthmakers.” (Molnar 2003: 223) Which of the two ways a dispositionalist endorses—
dispositions explain necessity or necessity explains the dispositional link—my arguments are, if 
successful at all, equally effective (although they are here formulated against the latter claim). What 
they generally show is that dispositionality and necessity do not go together well. For convincing 
arguments against Molnar’s direction of the necessity-dispositionality claim see (Eagle forthcoming). 
6 I know of no explicit attempts to argue along the second strategy. This is largely because many 
people tacitly assume success. 
7 In her 1971 paper “Causality and Determination” where Elisabeth Anscombe already argues that 
“causation […] is not to be identified with necessitation” (Anscombe 1971: 92). She ends her paper 
with the words: “The most neglected of the key topics in this subject are: interference and 
prevention.” (Anscombe 1971: 104) That is, Anscombe already saw that there is some major friction 
between interference and necessity. Support for her arguments can be found in Dorothy Edgington’s 
(Edgington 1990). Note also that Anscombe’s way to oppose Hume’s scepticism about connections in 
nature is not via Kripke’s a posteriori route through scientific discoveries, rigid designation, etc., but via 
direct perception of causation (cf. my footnote 1). 
8 This history is well documented and the counterexamples to the analyses (“finks”, “antidotes”, 
“prodotes”, “masques”) have reached folkloric status in analytic metaphysics. Therefore, I allow 
myself to rehearse only one brief episode of the analysis’s ups and downs. For historical accounts see 
(Malzkorn 2001) and (Schrenk 2008). 
9 Which consequences we should draw from the (alleged) failure of a semantic analysis is anyway 
unclear. Inspired by logical empiricists’ (anti-)metaphysics and epistemology people have assumed that 
if Humeans should be able to provide a watertight analysis that answers to all possible 
counterexamples then dispositions are not real. Yet, outside the constraints of 
empiricism/verificationism, conclusions from semantics to metaphysics are not so straightforward (cf. 
Heil 2005: 345). (This means, of course, that also the opposite question will be controversial: if no 
counterfactual analysis ever succeeds can we, on this basis alone, conclude that dispositions are real?) 
10 Similarly we find Alexander Bird saying: “Necessarily if the potency is instantiated and receives its 
stimulus, then the manifestation will occur.” (Bird 2007: 64) 
11 I should say that Ellis is thankfully someone who explicitly attempts an argument for the 
application of Kripke to causation where others only tacitly assume that it works. 
12 To be fair to Ellis I have to confess that I omitted a line from one of his quotes where he already 
excludes interferences in the fashion of attempt (2): “Therefore, […] for all x, necessarily, if x has P, 
and x is in circumstances of the kind C, then x will display an effect of the kind E, unless there are 
defeating conditions that would mask this display.” (Ellis 2001: 286; my emphasis) As I will show now, this 
additional line still does not resolve our problems. 
13 Andreas Hüttemann (Hüttemann 1998) has convincing arguments for dispositional realism which 
revolve around what he calls “CMDs”: continuously manifesting dispositions. The upshot here is that these 
continuous displays cannot be captured by metaphysical necessity. 
 17 | 17 
                                                                                                                                     
14 Note that each of these C, C1, C2, C3, etc. might well itself be a set of a multitude of C’, C’’, C’’’, … 
for there might be many more sufficient ways to trigger a disposition so that it then brings about the 
respective Es. (That, of course, depends on how fine grained one individuates the effects: there might 
be, after all, only one way to get exactly that breaking of a glass.) 
15 This picture reflects, of course, John Mackie’s causes as INUS condition. We may translate Mackie’s 
idea thus: an ordinary dispositional predicate’s antecedent describes an insufficient, yet, necessary (in 
the sense of “needed”) part of all unnecessary (“not needed”) but sufficient C, C1, C2, C3, … The 
sufficiency of the various Cis for their effects corresponds to metaphysical necessitation in our sense. 
16 I wish to use the phrase ‘amounts to’ in a weak, non-reductive sense. Maybe that bundle is all there 
is to a disposition, maybe it’s just one essential part. This is for the necessiatrian dispositionalist to 
decide. 
17 I owe this insight to Stephen Mumford. 
18 This is not to say that only a few things happen with necessity. Probably everything does in this 
picture, yet, everything (individuated in a fine grained way) happens only once. 
19 Similar to my conclusions, Nancy Cartwright writes in her recent paper “No God, no Laws”: “And 
a regularity is just a collection of paired events: B follows A once, B follows A again, it does so again, 
and again and... It doesn’t matter in what mode the regularity occurs, whether for instance this kind of 
pattern would continue […] in different possible worlds. A regularity is just a collection of paired 
events and a collection does not make any of its members happen.” (Cartwright 2007: 7) 
20 Bertrand Russell, in his “On the Notion of Cause” (Russell 1912/2003), argues against the 
necessitation view of causation in a way that is parallel to my arguments in many respects. (Thanks are 
due to an anonymous referee of this journal for reminding me of Russell’s paper). The necessity 
Russell attacks is, of course, not Kripkean metaphysical necessity but rather some kind of causal 
sufficiency: ‘a necessitates b iff b follows a invariably’. In his argument Russell, too, highlights first that 
there is “some finite lapse of time τ between cause and effect” and that therefore, “however short we 
make the interval τ, something may happen during this interval which prevents the expected result.” 
(Russell 1912/2003: 169). Consequently, “in order to be sure of the expected effect, we must know 
that there is nothing in the environment to interfere with it. But this means that the supposed cause 
[corresponding to a minimal antecedent in a disposition; my addendum] is not, by itself, adequate to 
ensure the effect.” (Russell 1912/2003: 169) 
In order to remedy this shortcoming Russell suggests, similar to my reverse light-cones, to “include 
the environment” (Russell 1912/2003: 169) Yet, analogously to the discreteness argument above, it is 
clear that “as soon as we include the environment, the probability of repetition is diminished, until at 
last, when the whole environment is included, the probability of repetition becomes almost nil.” 
(Russell 1912/2003: 169) Russell therefore rejects this manoeuvre: a cause “must not be defined too 
narrowly […] for if such considerations [the whole universe; my addendum] were relevant, our 
“event” would occur at most once, and the [causal] law would cease to give information.” (Russell 
1912/2003: 169) 
The overall conclusion Russell draws is slightly different from the one I will end my paper with. 
Whereas Russell famously opted for the elimination of the concept of causation from our 
philosophical vocabulary (at least in 1912)—“the word “cause” is so inextricably bound up with 
misleading associations as to make its complete extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary 
desirable.” (Russell 1912/2003: 164)—I still have all sympathies for dispositional predicates and 
dispositions. I just do not believe that (metaphysical) necessity has anything to do with them. 
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